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THE ROLE OF FINANCIAL REGULATION IN
PRIVATE FINANCIAL FIRMS: RISK
MANAGEMENT AND THE LIMITATIONS OF
THE MARKET MODEL
James A. Fanto *
I. INTRODUCTION: THE OLD VERSUS THE NEW IN FINANCE
Remember the former world of finance? There were easily identifiable
financial institutions that operated primarily in their allotted spheres, with
their designated regulators and with most of their activity in the public eye.
Firms registered as broker-dealers specialized in either investment banking
(corporate finance and merger advice) or retail brokerage; 1 banks took in
deposits and made mainly commercial loans; 2 and insurance companies
underwrote policies, hedged their insurance risk in the reinsurance market,
and were major buyers of company debt in private placements. 3 The upstart
was the private equity firm, which shook up the corporate and financial
establishment in the 1990s, as it essentially reintroduced merchant banking
into the United States and provided a new kind of investment for
institutions and wealthy individuals. 4 Stock exchanges, with a few rare
exceptions, were quasi-public, essentially national organizations with a
characteristic clientele, such as large capitalization firms for the New York
Stock Exchange. 5 This is, of course, an idealized portrait; the last twenty
years of the 20th century also saw the beginning of an intense competition
between, and a blending of, the different kinds of financial institutions, as
each one encroached upon the territory of the others by offering similar
products and services. Now there exists a very different financial world,
where it is not always easy to categorize a particular financial institution,

* Professor, Brooklyn Law School.
1. See generally Arthur B. Laby, Resolving Conflicts of Duty in Fiduciary Relationships, 54

AM. U.L. REV. 75, 83–84 (2004) (“The activities of many financial firms can be divided roughly
into two categories, investment banking and retail brokerage . . . .”).
2. See Independent Bankers Ass’n of America v. C.T. Conover, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22529, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 24, 1985) (“Section 2(c) of the BHCA as amended in 1970, defines
the term ‘bank’ for purposes of that act as ‘any institution . . . which (1) accepts deposits that the
depositor has a legal right to withdraw on demand, and (2) engages in the business of making
commercial loans.’”).
3. See generally, Emeric Fischer, Banking and Insurance – Should Ever the Twain Meet?, 71
NEB. L. REV. 726 (1992).
4. See generally GEORGE P. BAKER & GEORGE DAVID SMITH, THE NEW FINANCIAL
CAPITALISTS: KOHLBERG KRAVIS ROBERTS AND THE CREATION OF CORPORATE VALUE (1998)
[hereinafter NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS].
5. See generally Jaclyn Braunstein, Pound Foolish: Challenging Executive Compensation in
the U.S. and the U.K., 29 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 747, 766 (2004) (“[T]he NYSE is not a publicly
traded entity and, as the world’s largest stock exchange, serves as a ‘quasi-public institution with
an important regulatory function.’”) (internal citation omitted).
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there has been a growth of private financial institutions, 6 and financial
regulators appear to be constantly trying to catch up with financial
developments.
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) officially
created the financial conglomerate, allowing diverse financial institutions to
operate together under a single financial holding company. 7 In this
structure, the separate identities and functions of the financial institutions
are nominally maintained. 8 Commercial banks still conduct “banking,”
while their investment bank, futures commission merchant, and insurance
company affiliates focus on their traditional tasks. 9 However, the financial
institutions often supply overlapping products 10 and are ultimately operated
together in the financial conglomerate as the group’s services are offered to
clients in combination. 11

6. See generally NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS, supra note 4; Peter J. Wallison, For
Financial Regulation, Era of Big Government Really is Over, STATE NEWS SERVICE, June 17,
2008, at 2–4 (“One of the most significant unremarked trends of the last twenty-five years has
been the growth of private financial markets and private financial institutions . . . . From 1996 to
2006, the real assets of the ten largest private-sector banks in the world grew in nominal terms
from $4.6 trillion to $17.4 trillion, a growth rate of 277 percent.”).
7. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified in
scattered sections of 12, 15, 16, 18 U.S.C.).
8. See generally F. Jean Wells & William D. Jackson, Major Financial Services Legislation:
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (P.L. 106-102): An Overview, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (1999),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/glba/RL30375.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
9. See generally id. See also Elizabeth F. Brown, E Pluribus Unum-Out of Many, One: Why
the United States Needs a Single Financial Services Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 1, 7
(2005) (“The [Gramm-Leach Bliley Act] repealed portions of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, the
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and other laws in order to permit banks, securities firms,
insurance companies, and other entities engaged in the provision of financial services to become
affiliated with one another in order to form financial conglomerates. These types of affiliations
allow financial services entities to cross sell each other’s products and services.”) (internal
citations omitted); see also Isaac Lustgarten, International Legal Developments in Review 1999:
Business Regulation: The Gramm-Leach Bliley Act and International Banking, 34 INT’L LAW 429
(Part II) (1999).
10. For example, a variable annuity requires a person to make payments until retirement, at
which time that person receives a stream of income until his or her death that is based on the
investment performance of the payments. It is offered by insurance companies, broker-dealers and
banks, and it is classified as a securities product. See Nationsbank of North Carolina, N.A. v.
Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995).
11. Unfortunately, the best example of this is that, during the corporate scandals of the early
2000s, it was revealed that many parts of certain financial holding companies collaborated with
the scandal-ridden firms. See generally The Role of Financial Institutions in Enron’s Collapse:
Hearing Before Permanent Subcomm. On Investigations of the S. Comm. on Gov’t Affairs, 107th
Cong., 107-618 (2002) (statement of Robert Roach, Chief Investigator); In re Enron Corp., No.
01-16034, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2003) (App. D, Third Interim Report of Neal Batson at 1), available
at http://www.enron.com/media/3rd_Examiners_Report_AppendixD.pdf (last visited Nov. 11,
2008) (“Citigroup helped Enron implement-and in some cases designed-a number of SPE
transactions.”).
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In the private investment world, private equity has expanded to include
venture capital, which specializes in start-up companies, 12 and hedge funds,
which make their money from trading strategies. 13 Investment banks have
also embraced this private world, offering asset management comparable to
the private financial participants (e.g., private equity firms), as well as
providing services to them. 14 However, the competition between regulated
and unregulated firms is not all in one direction: private firms have become
major providers of capital to nonfinancial firms and are now the equivalent
of investment and commercial banks. 15 Stock exchanges have also gone
international to expand their product offerings, and have themselves
become privately owned, for-profit companies. 16 Moreover, they compete
with broker-dealers, commercial banks, and private financial firms, which
have created their own trading platforms. 17
On the regulatory front, Gramm-Leach-Bliley reaffirmed the previous
framework of functional regulation, which means that regulators maintain
jurisdiction over their traditional clientele (e.g., the Securities Exchange
Commission (SEC) over broker-dealers and the Office of the Comptroller
of the Currency (OCC) over national banks) and the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve regulates the holding company and provides a
safeguard of last resort for the stability of the financial system. 18 However,
as will be discussed in more detail below, much financial activity, including

12. See generally NEW FINANCIAL CAPITALISTS, supra note 4; see also National Venture
Capital Assoc., The Venture Capital Industry: An Overview, http://www.nvca.org/def.html (last
visited Sept. 24, 2008).
13. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-200, HEDGE FUNDS: REGULATORS
AND MARKET PARTICIPANTS ARE TAKING STEPS TO STRENGTHEN MARKET DISCIPLINE, BUT
CONTINUED ATTENTION IS NEEDED 1 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d08200.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) [hereinafter GAO HEDGE FUND REPORT] (“[T]he term is
commonly used to describe pooled investment vehicles that are privately organized and
administered by professional managers and that often engage in active trading of various types of
securities and commodity futures and options contracts.”).
14. The services fall under the rubric of “prime brokerage,” which generally means that a
registered broker-dealer offers to a hedge fund transaction services for its trading and secured
loans using the securities owned by the fund as collateral. See generally Philipp Hildebrand,
Hedge funds and prime broker dealers: steps towards a “best practice proposal”, 10 FIN.
STABILITY REV. 67 (2007), available at http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/rsf/
2007/etud2_0407.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
15. See Andrew Crockett, The evolution and regulation of hedge funds, 10 FIN. STABILITY
REV. 19, 22 (Apr. 2007), available at http://www.banque-france.fr/gb/publications/telechar/rsf/
2007/etud2_0407.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
16. The best example here is the former New York Stock Exchange, which is now NYSE
Euronext, after going private and merging with a major European exchange. See generally
NYSE.com, About Us, http://www.nyse.com/about/1088808971270.html (last visited Aug. 26,
2008).
17. See generally Scott Patterson & Aaron Lucchetti, Boom in ‘Dark Pool’ Trading Networks
Is Causing Headaches on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., May 8, 2008, at C1 (describing alternative
trading systems).
18. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1844(c)(2), (4) & (5) (2008).
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private financial firms, remains outside the direct jurisdiction of any
financial regulator. 19
This essay addresses whether financial regulators have taken the most
appropriate regulatory approach towards the diverse and complex private
financial activities that occur both inside and outside regulated financial
conglomerates. Part II identifies the various kinds of private financial
activities and examines the general approach of financial regulation to the
unregulated private firms conducting those activities. Part III reviews the
migration of those activities into regulated financial firms and the primary
strategy of regulators regarding those activities, as well as the similarities
between this strategy and the regulators’ approach with respect to
unregulated firms, particularly in risk management. Next, Part IV addresses
questions raised by the current financial crisis about the effectiveness of
these similar approaches. Then, Part V discusses major obstacles to
improving risk management in private firms and in regulated firms
conducting comparable activities, especially the structure of employment
and compensation in the securities industry today. In conclusion, Part VI
provides several observations about the possibility of reform with respect to
private financial activities.
II. THE PRIVATE FINANCIAL WORLD 20
Private financial institutions are typically organized in a uniform
fashion. Financial specialists, often former investment bankers and traders,
set up financial advisory firms, which may or may not be registered with
the SEC as an investment adviser or broker-dealer. 21 These firms, in turn,
organize investment funds to which institutional investors and high-networth individuals subscribe. 22 The funds are unregulated because they do
not raise money through a public capital-raising 23 and because the funds
themselves qualify for one of the exceptions to the Investment Company
19. See discussion infra Part III.
20. For current purposes, private financial institutions are those institutions involved in private

equity and alternative asset management.
21. Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, an investment adviser need not register with
the SEC if it does not hold itself out to the public as such, nor acts as an adviser to a registered
investment company, and if it has fewer than 15 clients in the preceding 12 months. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-3(b)(3) (2008). “Client” refers to a fund established by the adviser, not to the beneficial
owners of the fund. A person need not register as a “broker” or “dealer” unless it engages “in the
business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others,” (15 U.S.C. §
78c(a)(4)(A) (2008)), or “in the business of buying and selling securities for such person’s own
account through a broker or otherwise.” 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5)(A). A key term in this definition is
“business.” Since the adviser purchases and sells securities for the client fund, it is not considered
to be a broker or dealer.
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7).
23. In other words, funds raise money through private placements, which can be exempt from
the requirement to register the securities offering with the SEC. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2008); 17
C.F.R. § 230.506 (2008).
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Act of 1940. 24 The funds, in turn, specialize in a particular kind of
investment and/or investing strategy depending upon the expertise of the
investment manager. In general, private equity funds focus on long-term
investments in existing firms that are often taken private to be
rehabilitated. 25 In contrast, venture capital funds invest in start-up firms, 26
while hedge funds focus on trading strategies with extensive use of
derivatives to hedge risk or to speculate. 27 Thus, depending upon the kind
of fund, investors will be more or less restricted in receiving the return on
their investment. Many funds also use extensive leverage in their
investments in order to boost their returns, as do investors in the funds. 28
Some private financial firms prefer to remain unregulated and thus elect
not to become registered broker-dealers or investment advisers. 29 Apart
from abortive efforts to regulate these private financial participants, the
approach of U.S. financial regulators to them has been twofold. 30 First,
financial regulators indirectly regulate: they gather information about, and
exercise some influence over, the activities of private financial firms
through their power over regulated firms, such as banks and brokerdealers. 31 These latter, regulated firms provide products and services to the
private firms, such as trading services and margin in the case of brokerdealers 32 and loans and investment products, such as participation in
24. Investment companies are exempt from registration if their shares are not offered publicly
and if either their shares are not beneficially owned by more than 100 investors, 15 U.S.C. § 80a3(c)(1), or their purchasers are “qualified” (i.e., individuals owning at least $5 million in
investments, or firms owning at least $25 million in investments). 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7).
25. See
Investopedia.com,
Private
Equity,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/
privateequity.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
26. See National Venture Capital Association, supra note 12.
27. See Investopedia.com, Hedge Fund, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hedgefund.asp
(last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
28. See Thomas Schneeweis, Hossein Kazemi &Vassilis Karavas, Leverage Impacts on Hedge
Fund Risk and Return Performance, ISENBERG SCH. OF MGMT., U. MASS. at 1 (2004), available at
http://www.lyracapital.com/documents/Leverage-final.pdf (last visited Nov. 9, 2008). They do
this in accordance with a basic principle of financial economics that, if one borrows money at a
fixed rate of return in order to invest it, together with one’s own money, at a greater rate, the
return on the investor’s contribution will be greatly magnified. See also Investopedia.com,
Leverage, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/leverage.asp (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
29. See GAO HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 13, at 12–13 (discussing registration of hedge
fund advisers).
30. The most notorious example was the SEC’s rule amendment to Rule 203(b)(3)-1, which
changed the definition of client for adviser registration purposes from the “fund” to the “beneficial
owners” of the fund (i.e., limited partners or members in limited liability companies), except for
funds with the lengthy lock-ups typical of private equity or venture capital funds. This rule was
struck down as outside the SEC’s power by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit. See Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
31. This is the general practice in sophisticated economies throughout the world with respect
to hedge funds. See generally Daniele Nouy, Indirect supervision of hedge funds, 10 FIN.
STABILITY REV. 95 (2007).
32. On this indirect regulation through broker-dealers, see GAO HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra
note 13, at 19.
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syndicated loans and structured vehicles, in the case of commercial banks. 33
The private participants are also counterparties with regulated financial
firms in the trading of many, often exotic, financial instruments, particularly
complex derivatives, such as credit derivatives. 34 Financial regulators can
thus gather information about the activities and risk exposure of private
firms and their sponsors from the regulated firms, especially since the risk
models and capital positions of the regulated firms have to take account of
and reflect their dealings with these firms. 35 Indeed, financial regulators can
influence the conduct of the unregulated firms simply by insisting that
particular transactions with them occur in a specified way or that the
provision of leverage to them be restricted (e.g., by requiring more capital
in a regulated firm in order to engage in a particular transaction with a
private firm). 36
Second, financial regulators encourage the alternative asset
management industry to adopt “best practices” for its members and thus to
regulate itself. 37 For example, the President’s Working Group on Financial
Markets, which is composed of the main U.S. financial regulators, 38
recently received reports of proposed best practices for hedge funds 39 and
for hedge fund investors. 40 Financial regulators are being particularly astute
here, for they must know that self-regulation is often a predecessor to
official regulation, which occurs after the private parties have created a
regulatory model that they cannot enforce among themselves, and when
regulators step in and transform the model into a public good. 41 In a related
33. Id. at 24–25.
34. See id. (noting that hedge funds account for more than 80% of the credit derivatives

market). These would be instruments in which, among other things, an investor essentially
purchases protection for the risk of holding debt of a particular company. See Investopedia.com,
Credit Derivative, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/creditderivative.asp (last visited Nov. 9,
2008).
35. See Nouy, supra note 31. See also GAO HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 13, at 2.
36. See Nouy, supra note 31. See also GAO HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 13, at 2.
37. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ASSET MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE TO THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING
GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, BEST PRACTICES FOR THE HEDGE FUND INDUSTRY (2008),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp927.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008)
[hereinafter ASSET MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE REPORT].
38. The Group is chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury and includes the Chairs of the
Federal Reserve, the SEC, and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. See United States
Department of the Treasury, Office of Financial Market Policy, Mission,
http://www.treas.gov/offices/domestic-finance/financial-markets/fin-market-policy/ (last visited
Nov. 9 2008).
39. These reports were provided by hedge fund managers themselves. See ASSET MANAGERS’
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 37.
40. These reports were provided by institutional investors. See id.
41. That is, a particular sector of the financial industry initially agrees with financial regulators
to adopt best practices under the view that adequate self-regulation may make regulation
unnecessary. However, once the best practices become standard, it is in the interest of sector
members to have the government enforce them, so that a participant cannot “free ride” on the
enhanced reputation of the sector without actually complying with the standards. For efforts in the
United Kingdom to promote self-regulation of hedge funds, see HEDGE FUND WORKING GROUP,
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vein, financial regulators also encourage participants to develop standards
with respect to activities and transactions that unregulated financial firms
engage in, often with regulated firms as their counterparties. 42 By doing so,
financial regulators avoid devoting scarce resources to gaining expertise in
an area in which they have no experience. 43
Financial regulators are not necessarily focused on preventing the
failure of a private financial firm. While financial regulators should be
indifferent, they may actually hope that such a failure would lead the
remaining private participants to agree to regulation and/or to enter into
regulated financial groups, which would lead to a consolidation and
maturation of the private financial industry. The real concern for financial
regulators, which justifies their monitoring, is that the failure of an
unregulated financial firm might adversely affect a regulated financial
institution, which could, in turn, lead to a cascade of additional failures of
financial institutions, a freezing up of the financial system, and, in the worst
scenario, a drastic decrease in overall economic activity. 44 This
amplification of financial institution failure is known as systemic risk. 45
Financial regulators faced this kind of situation in 1998 when they had to
deal with the failure of the celebrated hedge fund, Long-Term Capital
Management, which triggered more regulatory attention to the systemic
risks posed by hedge funds. 46
The failure of a private financial firm, if it is large enough, could also
give rise to widespread media and political attention. 47 Increasingly,
ordinary individuals are exposed to private financial firms through their
investments in pension funds and in other institutional investors, which in
turn invest in these private firms’ alternative investment vehicles. 48 Indirect
financial harm to ordinary individuals from the failure of a private firm
HEDGE
FUND
STANDARDS:
FINAL
REPORT
(2008),
available
at
http://www.hfsb.org/sites/10109/files/final_report.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2008).
42. See, e.g., id.
43. For an example of this kind of self-regulation, see Int’l Swaps and Derivatives Ass’n., Inc.,
http://www.isda.org (last visited Nov. 10, 2008). In particular, this Association adopted guidelines
on structured products in response to the recent subprime financial crisis. See, e.g., STRUCTURED
PRODUCTS: PRINCIPLES FOR MANAGING THE DISTRIBUTOR-INDIVIDUAL INVESTOR
RELATIONSHIP, INT’L SWAPS AND DERIVATIVES ASS’N., INC. (Exposure Draft May 12, 2008),
available
at
http://www.sifma.org/private_client/pdf/GlobalRSP-Distributor-PrinciplesMay
ExposureDraft.pdf (last visited Nov. 10 2008).
44. Roger Ferguson & David Laster, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV.
45, 50 (2007).
45. See id. at 49.
46. See generally ROGER LOWENSTEIN, WHEN GENIUS FAILED: THE RISE AND FALL OF
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2000).
47. See generally Raghuram G. Rajan, Financial conditions, alternative asset management
and political risks: trying to make sense of our times, 10 FIN. STABILITY REV. 137, 141–142
(2007).
48. See Riva D. Atlas & Mary Willliams Walsh, Pension Officers Putting Billions Into Hedge
Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2005, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/27/
business/yourmoney/27hedge.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
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could lead to media demands for regulation and attention from politicians
begrudgingly responding to the crisis. 49 If the failure were significant
enough, financial regulators would also be blamed for not having been
more aggressive in regulating, or advocating the regulation of, the private
firms. 50
The current financial crisis that was sparked by the failure of the
subprime mortgage market is a good example of this kind of acute media
and political attention on financial regulation. 51 It has brought to the
forefront the following valid concerns about an approach that relies on
indirect regulation of private financial firms coupled with their selfregulation. 52 First, some regulated firm personnel have strong incentives not
to monitor closely private firms. For example, traders within investment
banks who are directly involved in the provision of transaction services to
private firms are reluctant to limit such business even when required by
their firm’s risk management. Even investment bank and commercial bank
management may resist the limits, for they are competing with other banks
for the business of private firms. This problem is exacerbated because the
personnel and management of investment and commercial banks may not
rationally compare the gains from short-term trading and other gains from
ignoring the position limits with the discounted present value of the longterm dangers arising from ignoring these limits. As will be discussed more
below, current employment and compensation practices in regulated firms
undermine a proper recognition of the discounted long-term dangers. 53 This
fact applies to bank executives as well, since in the financial conglomerates
that deal with private firms and that are publicly traded firms, executives
have the typical enormous compensation contracts that make them
impervious to any financial disaster. 54
Second, the current model of indirect regulation may be extremely
difficult to carry out for regulated institutions, which are actually few in
number and all critical to the financial system. 55 Obtaining adequate
49. See e.g., Jackie Calmes, Obama and McCain have different approaches to Wall Street,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 16, 2008, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/
09/16/america/16record.php (last visited Nov. 10 2008) (noting that both Obama and McCain
have responded to the recent turmoil in the financial industry with calls for increased regulation).
50. Crockett, supra note 15, at 25.
51. See discussion infra Part IV.
52. On some of the following points, see generally Nouriel Roubini, Hedge Funds: Do We
Need To Regulate Them and How? (June 2007) (on file with author).
53. See discussion infra Part V.
54. See, e.g., Supplemental Information on CEO Pay and the Mortgage Crisis, Memorandum
from the Majority Staff, Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform to Members of the Comm.
on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (describing enormous compensation
contracts of CEOs (departing) of financial institutions that performed poorly during the mortgage
crisis).
55. In the United States, only the financial conglomerates, like Citigroup and JP Morgan, have
the capacity to provide services to the private financial institutions. See Hildebrand, supra note 14,
at 72.
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information from the private firms with whom they do business is difficult
because private firms are in competition with the regulated firms, giving
them a competitive incentive not to share all their information, and
increasing the likelihood that they will spread their business among
different financial firms. 56 For example, a regulated financial institution
may find it difficult to get a complete understanding of the amount of
leverage in a particular hedge fund, since investors may borrow funds to
make an investment in a fund of funds, the fund of funds may use leverage
for its investments in the hedge fund, and the fund itself may borrow from
numerous financial intermediaries. 57
The appropriateness of the current approach to private financial firms
may come down to the adequacy of the risk management models used by
regulated firms in their dealings with unregulated counterparties, as well as
of the models used by unregulated firms to manage their own risks. To be
adequate in the former case, the model would have to take account of the
risk that the investment or commercial bank would not have all the
necessary information about its unregulated counterparty (or that the
counterparty might act opportunistically in withholding certain of this
information), specify how the financial institution responds to this risk (e.g.,
imposing higher margins, taking bigger “haircuts” on the collateral of the
private firm, limiting exposure to the private firm), and rigorously enforce
this response among its personnel. The model would have to assume that
the unregulated firm’s undisclosed direct and indirect leverage could be
greater than what is disclosed and then consider the consequences for the
regulated firm if a liquidity crisis arose for the private firm and for the
market more generally. A private financial firm needs similar models
addressing the same risks in the unregulated counterparties that it transacts
with. As discussed later in this essay, the question is whether current risk
models are up to these tasks and whether they can be adequately applied. 58
III. PRIVATE FINANCIAL FIRMS WITHIN THE REGULATED
WORLD
Private financial firms and their activities have also migrated into
regulated financial conglomerates due to Gramm-Leach-Bliley. As
discussed above, it officially approved the formation of financial holding
companies that engage, or that own companies that are engaged, in all kinds
of financial activities. 59 The statutory list it provided of permissible
financial activities is broad and covers all functions of a full-service
investment bank, including investment advisory services and merchant
56.
57.
58.
59.

See Crockett, supra note 15, at 26.
See Roubini, supra note 52, at 9.
See discussion infra Part IV.
See discussion infra Part II.
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banking. 60 Significantly, the statute also empowered the Federal Reserve
and the Treasury Department to add activities to the list and set forth openended criteria for them to use, such as changes in the competitive market for
financial services, technological developments for delivering financial
services, and the ability of the holding companies to compete in the
financial services marketplace. 61 Thus, as private financial firms offer new
kinds of financial products and services, as well as technological
innovations in their delivery, Gramm-Leach-Bliley permits financial
holding companies to acquire the private firms or engage themselves in
similar activities.
Therefore, a financial conglomerate can create, “in house,” the
equivalent of a private financial firm or, for the right price, acquire a private
firm, such as a private equity firm or a hedge fund adviser. Financial
conglomerates have done both to gain market share in these financial
activities. To take one notable example, the current CEO of Citigroup,
Vikram Pandit, came to Citigroup when it acquired his hedge fund firm. 62
Now, financial conglomerates, through their asset management divisions,
offer their own private equity and hedge funds to their wealthy clientele,
which are chiefly institutions and high net worth individuals. 63 They often
compete with the private financial firms to whom they provide prime
brokerage services. 64 The financial conglomerates also engage, for their
own account, in proprietary trading and investing, particularly similar to
hedge fund activity. 65 Private financial firms have thus been partly
“domesticated” by becoming a part of regulated financial conglomerates.
The regulation of private financial activities conducted within financial
conglomerates should pose less difficulty for financial regulators, who have
collective jurisdiction over the conglomerates. 66 Yet it is important to
emphasize the nature of this regulation. Particularly since Gramm-LeachBliley, financial regulators focus not so much on whether and how a
60. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4) (2008).
61. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)–(3).
62. Pandit was a founding member and chairman of Old Lane, L.P., a hedge fund and private

equity manager. Before that, he was the President and Chief Operating Officer of Morgan
Stanley’s investment banking business, which emphasizes the movement of personnel back and
forth between regulated and unregulated financial firms. Citigroup.com, Biography of Vikram
Pandit, http://www.citi.com/citigroup/profiles/pandit/bio.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2008).
63. See generally Goldman LBO Fund to Raise about $20B, AFX INTERN’L FOCUS, Mar. 27,
2007.
64. See generally Bank of the Year for M&A: Goldman Sachs, THE BANKER, Oct. 1, 2001,
available at http://www.thebanker.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/4325/Bank_of_the_year_for_
M_A:_Goldman_Sachs.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) (“Many critics believed that Goldman’s
active private equity investment and management of private equity money for third party investors
would generate conflict of interest between the bank and its clients.”).
65. See Emma Trincal, Hedge Funds Acquisitions: Good for Returns?, HEDGEWORLD DAILY
NEWS, Feb. 5, 2007, available at http://www.hedgeworld.com/preview_news.cgi?section=peop&
story=peop2873.html&area=premium&source=wealth_management (subscription required).
66. 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (2008).
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financial conglomerate can engage in particular financial activities, but
upon the competency of the group’s management and adequacy of the
group’s capital to support them. 67 In other words, the role of financial
regulators is no longer primarily to determine the appropriateness of a
particular financial activity for a group. There are several reasons for this
regulatory position, aside from Gramm-Leach-Bliley. First, financial
regulators do not have the resources to regulate substantively and quickly
evolving financial activities; they must leave this kind of regulation to the
market participants. 68 Second, the position is based upon a particular
normative view of the most economical way to regulate financial
institutions: if the financial institutions themselves (and the managers of
these institutions) have their own money at risk in the activities and not just
investors’ money, they have self-interested reasons for taking the necessary
safeguards with respect to the activities. 69
Determining adequate capital for financial institutions is no longer just
an issue of setting a certain baseline percentage of capital relative to the
assets, the traditional leverage ratio in financial institutions.70 Rather, for
some time, determining adequacy of capital has required a “risk-based”
approach: capital should be proportional to the risk of the assets themselves,
because the riskier the assets, the more capital is required. 71 Moreover, even
off-balance sheet activities must be taken into consideration in the capital
determination, both for their own inherent risks and the chance that they
will move onto the institution’s balance sheet. 72 Once an institution’s
overall risk exposure is calculated, the institution sets aside a statutorily
imposed amount of capital for these total “risk-weighted” assets and
activities. 73
As financial assets and activities have become more complex, risk
assessment of them and the resulting capital determination have evolved as
well. Under the current regulatory scheme for large financial institutions
that are engaged in private financial activities, the institutions themselves

67. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1) (2008).
68. This perspective is apparent in the structure of Gramm-Leach-Bliley. The basic conditions

for a firm to become a financial holding company are that its banks are “well capitalized” and
“well managed.” See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(1).
69. See infra for more discussion on the normative perspective in finance today.
70. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 3.6(b) (2008) (leverage ratio for national banks); 12 C.F.R. pt. 225,
App.
D
(2008),
available
at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/60002200.html#6000appendixd (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) (leverage ratio for holding companies).
71. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 3.6(a) (2008) (risk-based capital ratio).
72. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, App. A, Sec. III (2008), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/la-ws/rules/6000-1900.html#6000appendixa (last visited Nov. 10,
2008).
73. This is the well-known risk-based capital model promulgated by the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision and adopted by participatory countries. This model is known generally as
Basel I. For the Federal Reserve’s version, see 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, Apps. A, E & G.
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develop the models to assess asset risks, including counterparty risks. 74 In
other words, financial regulators increasingly leave it to the institutions
themselves to establish the models for determining the risk of assets and
thus the necessary amount of capital. Once again, the regulators recognize
that they do not have the resources to design risk models for use by the
institutions.
Therefore, bringing private financial activities within the sphere of
financial regulation does not necessarily mean that there is strong
governmental oversight of the activities or that the government establishes
standards for them. Certainly, regulators will become more familiar with
activities conducted within a regulated institution, or a part thereof, and can
insist upon certain practices with respect to them. But, except in a crisis,
financial authorities defer to the regulated institutions as to the conduct of
the activities and, significantly, to the risk assessment of the activities, and
thus to the adequacy of the financial institutions’ capital. In a financial
crisis, such as the current one, regulators may be more active in discussing
these valuation and risk assessment issues in detail, and even requiring that
institutions enhance their capital position. 75 However, if an institution’s
own practices and models are seriously inadequate, it is likely that this will
become apparent too late to prevent significant damage to, and even failure
of, the regulated firm. 76
IV. RISK MANAGEMENT AND THE MARKET MODEL
Current circumstances have presented a test for such a regulatory
approach that relies greatly on risk management models. The collapse of the
credit markets was triggered by losses in asset-backed securities, including
those backed by subprime mortgages. 77 During a sustained period of very
74. This remark greatly simplifies things. Under the revised Basel capital framework, known
as Basel II, a financial institution must take account of its credit risk, market risk, and operational
risk in determining its appropriate capital. While guidance has been given as to market risk (12
C.F.R. pt. 225, App. E), the Federal Reserve and the other banking regulators have just adopted
guidelines as to credit and operational risks. See Risk-Based Capital Standards, Advanced Capital
Adequacy Framework—Basel II. 72 Fed. Reg. 69,288 (Dec. 7, 2007). All these frameworks rely
heavily on an institution’s own assessment of its risks.
75. This essay was completed before the financial crisis became acute following the summer.
Obviously, in a significant crisis like the present one, regulators will do everything possible to
help financial institutions improve their capital position so that they, and our economic system,
can survive. See, e.g., Treasury Announces TARP Capital Purchase Program Description, U.S.
Treasury HP-1207 at 30, (Oct. 14, 2008), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
hp1207.htm (last visited Nov. 9, 2008).
76. See infra Part IV. Clearly, the demise of Bear Stearns was partly due to its own private
financial activities (e.g., hedge fund activity).
77. Subprime mortgages were initially and chiefly, but not exclusively, the cause of the
collapse. See generally Dr. Faten Sabry & Dr. Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown: A
Primer, Part I of a NERA Insight Series (June 21, 2007), available at http://www.nera.com/image/
SEC_SubprimeSeries_Part1_June2007_FINAL.pdf. However, economists who compare the
current crisis to other post-World War II financial crises believe that it has all the characteristics
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low interest rates, credit was extended widely to real estate buyers (even to
those with low incomes and little savings) and the debt was packaged and
resold as differing kinds of securities to investors looking for higher returns
on debt investments. 78 Unfortunately, it was done without a complete
appreciation for the risk of nonpayment by the buyers and with a resulting
mispricing of the asset-backed securities. 79 The default rates and
plummeting real estate values caused a broad reevaluation and repricing of
the securities backed by those mortgages. 80 As a result, investors became
suspicious that other asset-backed securities were not appropriately priced
and the onslaught of selling led to falling prices for those securities. 81 This
resulted in a general loss of liquidity for many of these and other financial
assets and a freezing-up of the market for issuance of similar securities. 82
For example, the market for existing leveraged-buyout (LBO) securities,
which are debt that fund company acquisitions by LBO firms, all but
disappeared, and banks, unwilling to make any new LBO loans, attempted
to extricate themselves from their prior commitments to fund buyouts. 83
With falling prices in financial assets, financial institutions became
concerned about their own weakened capital position and about the
solvency of their counterparties. 84 They were reluctant to engage in
of a serious, but typical, financial crisis: a run-up in asset and equity prices due to capital inflows,
slowing economic growth, an increase in public debt, and a large current account deficit. See
Carmen M. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Is the 2007 U.S. Sub-Prime Financial Crisis So
Different? An International Historical Comparison (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 13,761, 2008).
78. See generally Sabry & Schopflocher, supra note 77.
79. Many of the buyers made little or no down payments and were unable to afford the
mortgage payments. They depended on the homes increasing in value in order to make the home
purchase a worthwhile one. See generally JOINT ECON. COMM., THE U.S. HOUSING BUBBLE AND
THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: HOUSING AND HOUSING-RELATED FINANCE (2008).
80. In effect, the situation was complicated. There were securities backed by subprime
mortgages, often with the structured vehicle that held the mortgages issuing different classes or
“tranches” of securities. In addition, there were other vehicles that held these asset-back securities
and/or derivatives (e.g., credit default swaps based on these securities) and that issued their own
tranches of securities (known as collateralized debt obligations). See generally Sabry &
Schopflocher, supra note 77.
81. See generally Richard J. Caballero & Arvind Krishnamurthy, Musical chairs: a comment
on the credit crisis, 11 FIN. STABILITY REV. 9, 10 (2008).
82. See generally id.
83. The most well-known dispute involved the acquisition of Clear Channel by private equity
groups Bain Capital and Thomas H. Lee where the banks who had made the commitment to fund
the acquisition refused to honor their commitment. See Clear Channel Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc., 541 F. Supp.2d 874 (W.D. Tex. 2008). The dispute was settled, with
the banks receiving a more favorable interest rate. See Peter Lattman & Sarah McBride, Clear
Channel Suitors, Banks Reach Deal, WALL ST. J., May 14, 2008, at C3.
84. Problems came to financial institutions because they had to “mark to market” their own
securities positions, as well as clients’ securities collateral. However, when many kinds of
securities, which were traded privately among institutions, essentially stopped trading, it became
difficult for the institutions to give an accurate assessment of their own financial position. See
generally TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK
FORCE ON THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 16–19 (2008).
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transactions with, and particularly to extend credit to, other firms because
they were unsure about the exposure of these firms to the troubled
securities. 85 Indeed, these circumstances satisfied many of the conditions
for the classic definition of a financial “shock” with systemic consequences,
as opposed to a financial disturbance. 86
Problems from the credit crisis first surfaced in financial
conglomerates 87 due to their own involvement in private financial activities,
including in-house hedge funds, proprietary investments in asset-backed
securities, and closely related special purpose entities organized to invest in
assets. 88 As a result, those institutions took enormous write-downs in their
positions in asset-backed and other securities and had to raise capital in
order to maintain adequate capital ratios and to safeguard their very
solvency. 89 Bear Stearns did not survive the crisis on account of its
activities and investments in subprime assets and merged with J.P. Morgan,
another financial conglomerate. 90
85. See, e.g., Deborah Solomon, U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation’s Largest Banks, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 14, 2008, at A1 (listing the institutions: Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, J.P. Morgan, Bank
of America, Merrill Lynch (soon to be acquired by the preceding), Citigroup, Wells Fargo, Bank
of New York, State Street, with an estimated investment of a total of $130 billion by the
Treasury).
86. A shock, as opposed to a disturbance, would have (i) enhanced credit risk, particularly
counterparty credit risk, (ii) loss of market liquidity, (iii) rapid changes and losses of value of
financial instruments, particularly complex financial instruments, (iv) doubt about the accuracy of
financial models, (v) inability of models to deal with “tail” risks, (vi) problems in settlement, and
(vii) illiquidity of many complex instruments. These circumstances all seem present today.
However, other “shock” characteristics have not occurred, or not completely occurred: (viii) costs
of appropriate risk management, (ix) difficulty of restructuring when creditors cannot be located
easily, and (x) questions about the ability of regulators to work together. See COUNTERPARTY
RISK MGMT. POLICY GROUP, TOWARD GREATER FINANCIAL STABILITY: A PRIVATE SECTOR
PERSPECTIVE 7–10 (2005). For a detailed discussion of the crisis and the risks facing the global
financial system, see BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 78TH ANNUAL REPORT: 1 APR. 2007–31
MAR. 2008, at 137–49 (2008).
87. These include the former largest, full service investment banks, which were Bear Stearns,
Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley, and financial holding
companies. See Rachelle Younglai, SEC Finds Voice with Investment Bank Plan, BASELINE.COM,
July 28, 2008. As is now well known, as a result of the crisis, none of these investment banks any
longer exists as they formerly did. Two (Bear Stearns and Merrill) were sold to financial holding
companies; one (Lehman) went bankrupt; and two (Goldman and Morgan Stanley) themselves
became financial holding companies.
88. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman & Jenny Strasburg, Banks Fumble at Operating Hedge
Funds, WALL ST. J., May 31, 2008, at B1 (describing problems of financial conglomerates’
involvement in hedge funds); David Enrich, Citigroup Hedge-Fund Loss Weighs on Three Banks,
WALL ST. J., May 20, 2008, at C1.
89. See, e.g., David Enrich, et al., Citigroup, Merrill Seek More Foreign Capital, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 11, 2008, at A1.
90. The Wall Street Journal published an interesting series of articles on Bear Stearns’ demise.
See Kate Kelly, Lost Opportunities Haunt Final Days of Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., May 27,
2008, at A1; Kate Kelly, Fear, Rumors Touched Off Fatal Run on Bear Stearns, WALL ST. J., May
28, 2008, at A1; Kate Kelly, Bear Stearns Neared Collapse Twice in Frenzied Last Days, WALL
ST. J., May 29, 2008, at A1. See also SEC v. Cioffi: SEC Charges Two Former Bear Stearns
Hedge Fund Portfolio Managers with Securities Fraud, Exchange Act Release No. 20,625 (June
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This outcome suggests that, among other things, the risk management
models of financial conglomerates did not accurately assess the risks of the
securities and suffered from a fundamental failure: underestimation of the
risks that an unlikely, but disastrous, event might occur and that a liquidity
crisis would be widespread and affect all assets equally. 91 Moreover, the
risk models of the financial institutions were not the only faulty ones, for
the risk assessment of the securities by the “valuation” professionals, the
rating agencies, was similarly flawed. 92 As in the corporate financial
scandals that occurred earlier in this century, the rating agencies failed to do
their job of properly assessing the risk of securities, although this time it
involved evaluating the risks of the subprime asset-backed securities. 93
So far, it is not entirely clear how the crisis has affected private
financial firms. The crisis could be viewed as demonstrating another
example of an over-emphasis on financial regulation, since the most
publicized adversely affected institutions are regulated financial groups. Yet
it is difficult to know exactly the condition of unregulated financial
institutions, such as hedge fund advisers and the private equity firms that
have not gone public. Nevertheless, private equity firms have clearly
experienced problems with some of their funds, and there have been hedge
fund failures. 94 A lack of publicity and the structure of private financial
firms make it difficult to know exactly what problems they are
experiencing, if any. A hedge fund adviser can restrict withdrawals from
funds, or, if a fund’s investments are particularly troubled, the adviser can

19, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2008/lr20625.htm (explaining
civil action against managers of Bear Sterns’ own hedge funds that collapsed on account of their
subprime investments). Again, neither Lehman nor Merrill survived as stand-alone firms. See
Carrick Mollenkamp, Suzanne Craig, Serena Ng & Aaron Lucchetti, Lehman Files for
Bankruptcy, Merrill Sold, AIG Seeks Cash, WALL ST. J., Sept. 16, 2008, available at
http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB122145492097035549.html (last visited Nov. 10,
2008).
91. These are referred to as a “fat tail” problem (i.e., that the risk of unlikely events is greater
than it seems) and the co-variance problem (that assets begin to move together in price). See Barry
Eichengreen, Ten questions about the subprime crisis, 11 FIN. STABILITY REV. 19, 21 (2008).
92. See STAFF OF THE SEC’S OFFICE OF COMPLIANCE INSPECTIONS AND EXAMINATIONS,
SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF
SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES (2008) (for the problems in credit agencies with respect to
securities backed by subprime loans). The SEC in fact has proposed rule changes as to how credit
agencies rate structured products. See also Proposed Rules for Nationally Recognized Statistical
Rating Organizations, Exchange Act Release No. 57,967, 73 Fed. Reg. 36,212, 36,235 (June 25,
2008).
93. See, e.g., Peter R. Fisher, What happened to risk dispersion?, 11 FIN. STABILITY REV. 29,
35 (2008).
94. See, e.g., Carrick Mollenkamp & Serena Ng, Hedge Funds Squeezed As Lenders Get
Tougher, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008, at A1 (describing problems in Carlyle Group fund); Cassell
Bryan-Low, Carrick Mollenkamp & Gregory Zuckerman, Peloton Flew High, Fell Fast, WALL
ST. J., May 12, 2008, at C1 (describing the rapid demise of hedge fund Peloton Partners LLP).
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distribute the funds’ investments, rather than cash, to the investors. 95 By
remaining private, they are somewhat more protected from the kind of
market rumors that can lead to a “run on the bank” similar to the case of
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. 96 If funds are highly leveraged, as
seems to be the case, there should be more fund failures as funds are forced
to sell assets to meet margin calls. 97 But this action occurs if a prime broker
determines that the fund’s collateral is inadequate and if the regulated firm
were to do this, it might have to mark down its own positions in similar
collateral. 98
Serious problems may still emerge for private market participants,
which will in turn lead to even more difficulties for regulated financial
institutions. After all, many private market firms, as well as regulated firms,
engaged in risky investment strategies at a time of great liquidity, market
stability, and low interest rates, and this disguised the fact that their returns
resulted from favorable circumstances, not from their investment acumen. 99
In the parlance of the trade, few of them have outperformed the market by
producing “alpha.” 100 Although the regulated participants, through their
investment in or imitation of private firms, have suffered significant losses,
there is no reason to think that private market participants are in a much
better position. They all use similar risk models and also rely upon the
rating agencies for evaluations of their investments.
We can only hope now that the current circumstances do not end up
being a complete financial collapse, as opposed to the serious financial
95. See, e.g., Susan Pulliam, Locked In: When Hedge Funds Bar the Door, WALL ST. J., July
2, 2008, at A1 (describing how hedge funds can put up “gates” to restrict investors’ withdrawals
from a fund).
96. Landon Thomas, Jr., JPMorgan and Fed. Move to Bail Out Bear Stearns, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 14, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/14/business/14cnd-bear.html (last
visited Sept. 24, 2008).
97. Pulliam, supra note 95, at A1; see also Mortgage-bond Fund Sells Assets After Margin
Calls, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 2008, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/markets/200803-07-carlyle-fund-selloff_N.htm.
98. Moreover, the Federal Reserve’s response to the crisis has been to flood the market with
liquidity, which helps all financial participants, including hedge funds, remain afloat. See ADRIAN
BLUNDELL-WIGNALL, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., THE SUBPRIME CRISIS: SIZE,
DELEVERAGING AND SOME POLICY OPTIONS 19–20 (2008) (discussing, among other things,
threats posed by failure of hedge funds to prime broker-dealers and the manner in which the
injection of liquidity helps prevents this failure). For an excellent discussion of the Federal
Reserve’s conventional and unconventional efforts to address the crisis, see generally Stephen G.
Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis of 2007–2008
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 14,134, 2008) (noting in particular how the
Federal Reserve has increased the kind of collateral (including asset-backed securities) that it will
take for its loans and other operations).
99. See, e.g., Rajan, supra note 47, at 141–42.
100. In finance, “beta” refers to the market return that is correlated with market risks. An
investment manager should not be rewarded for obtaining a beta return, but only for adding to it,
which is alpha. See id. at 139–41 (speculating on the real reasons for the above average
performance of many hedge funds).
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shock that we are experiencing. A serious shock leads to an enormous
political reaction to finance, as retail investors demand reform of the
financial system. 101 Even if the financial system is stabilized, 102 the
dominant perspective regarding financial regulation—that there is too much
regulation and not enough deference given to market solutions—is likely to
ring hollow. 103 The problems with regulated financial conglomerates and
private financial firms have less to do with regulatory, as opposed to a
market, failure. As explained above, they arise from the failure of risk
models that have been developed by market participants, not imposed by
regulators. In other words, the current crisis raises questions about the
deference to such market participants.
V. THE RISK MANAGEMENT SOLUTION
One pragmatic solution to the problems raised in the current financial
crisis is to enhance the risk models and the role of risk management in
private financial firms and in regulated firms, with respect to the latter’s
comparable activities and their dealings with private firms. This response
would be similar to the reaction of financial regulators when it was revealed
that financial firms had participated in the corporate scandals of Enron,
Worldcom and others, either by setting up special purpose entities used by
companies to engage in fraud or, without inquiring into their true financial
position, by helping the companies raise capital. In those instances,
regulators encouraged financial institutions to set up a firm-wide transaction
and relationship committee that would evaluate risks, including legal and
reputation risks, arising from transactions and relationships with clients, and
to improve legal compliance by enhancing the role of a chief compliance
officer. 104 On the basis of the new crisis, financial regulators should tell
regulated financial firms that they must improve their risk models, institute
a firm-wide senior-level risk management committee, and appoint a chief
risk management officer or officers, who will have a special role in a firm’s
risk management.
Indeed, there have been reports that large financial institutions have
enhanced their risk management. For example, Citigroup now has multiple
risk managers whom the CEO regularly consults. 105 More significantly,
101. See id. at 142.
102. See Jia Lynn Yang, How bad is the mortgage crisis going to get?, available at

http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/14/news/economy/krugman_subprime.fortune/ (last visited Sept.
24, 2008).
103. This perspective is already making its way into the financial press. See also Jon Hilsenrath,
Markets Police Themselves Poorly, but Regulation Has Its Flaws, WALL ST. J., July 21, 2008, at
A2 (describing increasing disenchantment with market regulation of finance).
104. See generally James A. Fanto, Subtle Hazards Revisited: The Corruption of a Financial
Holding Company by a Corporate Client’s Inner Circle, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 7 (2004).
105. See David Enrich, Citigroup Installs New Risk Managers, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2008, at
C3.
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financial regulators are pushing for an improvement in risk management in
regulated institutions. As a result of the crisis, the Federal Reserve, the
SEC, and several major foreign financial regulators conducted a review of
risk management practices through the end of 2007 at major international
financial institutions under their jurisdiction. 106 The review revealed that,
despite past regulatory guidance on this subject, many major financial
institutions failed to provide an adequate governance structure for dealing
with risk. 107 In particular, the report found that, in the institutions, there was
rarely a high-level committee taking a firm-wide perspective on the current
risks facing the institution. 108 Without this kind of committee, management
of the firms could not see the magnitude of risks, share information about
them among its business lines, 109 and take coordinated action to address
them. 110 Moreover, the report found that risk models used in firms were
often flawed because they were based on inappropriate assumptions (e.g.,
ratings used for structured finance products were the same as those used for
standard corporate securities) and incomplete data (e.g., historical data was
only for periods of low volatility), and that stress testing of the models did
not anticipate possible scenarios (e.g., co-movement of assets prices at a
time of near total loss of liquidity). 111 They also found that risk
management at troubled firms was not imaginative and dynamic enough to
address fast changing situations, and that it was often pushed into the
background and even ridiculed by traders and bankers, who wanted to
complete transactions. 112
Clearly, the same pressure for enhanced risk management is being
placed upon the private financial firms. As has already been mentioned, the
President’s Working Group received two reports on best practices for hedge
funds and for investors in these funds. 113 Both of the reports recommended
106. See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, OBSERVATIONS
DURING THE
GROUP].

ON RISK MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
RECENT MARKET TURBULENCE (Mar. 6, 2008) [hereinafter SENIOR SUPERVISORS

107. See id.
108. See id. at 3, 7–9.
109. For example, brokers in a firm’s trading division would neglect to tell investment bankers

in corporate finance about the shrinking market for certain kinds of securities. Therefore, the
bankers would keep structuring deals to sell the securities, which would mean that the financial
institution itself might end up holding a large portion of the securities that it could not sell. This
apparently occurred during the subprime crisis because so many financial institutions were left
holding large positions in subprime-backed securities.
110. See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, supra note 106.
111. See id. at 3–5, 14–17.
112. See also Randall S. Kroszner, Governor, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., The
Importance of Fundamentals in Risk Management, Speech at the American Bankers Association
Spring Summit Meeting, (Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
speech/kroszner20080311a.htm; Paul L. Lee, Risk Management and Corporate Governance:
Mind the Gap, 90 BNA BANK. RE. 878 (May 5, 2008) (discussing history of emphasis upon risk
management oversight by bank regulators).
113. See ASSET MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 37.
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strengthening risk management with respect to operations of and
investments in these funds. 114 The report from hedge fund advisers insisted
that an adviser have in place procedures and policies (including having a
chief risk officer and other specialized personnel) for accurately measuring
the various risks of a fund (liquidity, leverage, market, counterparty credit,
and operational) so that it can accurately disclose the fund’s risk profile and
adequately deal with them. 115 Money managers are urged to improve their
risk management with respect to the risks of investing in hedge funds, the
evaluation of a hedge fund’s own risk management, and understanding of a
fund’s liquidity, leverage, operations and business risks, and compliance. 116
Certainly, it is important for both regulated and unregulated financial
firms to enhance their risk management. Yet the fundamental problem may
not be with the risk models themselves, or the risk managers. Even though
financial professionals can make mistakes, use flawed assumptions, or lack
the best organizational structure for raising risk concerns, all of which need
to be addressed and improved, the real problem may be that there are
serious obstacles to installing or following proper risk management in a
financial firm.
These obstacles may include the compensation structure, related
employment practices, and ultimately the ideology prevalent in financial
firms. For its participants, Wall Street has become a place of short-term
rewards and compensation for short-term results, such as bonuses based
upon fees for completing transactions and for the performance of a trading
desk. 117 Private financial firms are no different, although private equity
firms may have a longer-term horizon, given how the firms structure their
management and performance fees. 118 It is not an exaggeration to say that
financial professionals have a basic goal of obtaining as much
compensation as possible and then, if necessary, moving on, even if it
means switching from firm to firm and from regulated to unregulated firm,
and back again. Moreover, financial firms have reinforced this conduct
because they use an extreme version of the standard short-term cost/benefit
approach in dealing with their employees: “either produce or get out.” Even
the financial regulators that issued the report on risk management, discussed
114. See id.; see also REPORT OF THE INVESTORS’ COMMITTEE TO THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING
GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, BEST PRACTICES FOR HEDGE FUND INVESTORS (2008),
available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp927.htm [hereinafter INVESTORS’
COMMITTEE REPORT].
115. See ASSET MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 37, at 22–32; INVESTORS’
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 114.
116. See ASSET MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 37, at 22–36.
117. See Dennis K. Berman, Grim Reaper of Jobs Stalks Street, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2008, at
C1 (discussing these practices).
118. Generally, private equity firms will receive their compensation when a particular fund is
liquidated after its investments in underlying companies have been sold. Hedge funds receive both
fees for assets under management and performance fees. See ASSET MANAGERS’ COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 37, at 9–10 (on hedge fund fees).
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above, observed that the current financial crisis was partly due to the shortterm compensation structure common at Wall Street firms and to its
resulting focus upon making deals and acquiring market share regardless of
the risks involved. 119
In these circumstances, with these compensation and structural
pressures, risk managers have difficulties in finding ways reasonably to
decrease risk, even if they use adequate risk models. Risk managers can use
their models to emphasize that catastrophic risks are greater than what
people believe (the “fat tail” of risk). However, bankers and traders,
concerned about their bonuses, and management, concerned about firm
profitability and share price, will argue that the model exaggerates the risks
and that someone emphasizing the fat tail is being unduly pessimistic at the
expense of business. 120 Financial professionals also suffer from the typical
human focus upon the present and tendency to use an overly optimistic
discount rate when evaluating bad future outcomes. 121
More importantly, if there is no crisis present or on the horizon, risk
managers have little to appeal to when dealing with bankers, traders, and
executives in financial firms. They cannot appeal to the long-term stability
of the firm because few executives and employees will have a sufficiently
long-term horizon and senior executives are also unlikely to worry, given
the rich benefits accorded to them. Appealing to the long-term financial
stability of the economy and the country will also fail, because it will
conflict with the concept of pursuit of individual wealth that is thought to
insulate individuals from any macroeconomic disaster. In any event, such
concerns are too abstract to be taken into consideration in the dominant
cost/benefit calculus. Furthermore, there is nothing to ensure that the risk
119. See SENIOR SUPERVISORS GROUP, supra note 106, at 7; see also Randall S. Kroszner,
Improving Risk Management in Light of Recent Market Events, Speech at the Global Association
for Risk Management Professionals Annual Risk Convention (Feb. 5, 2008), available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/kroszner20080225a.htm (“Clearly, it is up to
financial institutions themselves—not bank supervisors—to decide how compensation should be
structured, but managers and boards of directors should understand the consequences of providing
too many short-term and one-sided incentives. They would benefit from thinking about
compensation on more of a risk-adjusted basis. Accordingly, I encourage institutions to think
about ways to alter existing compensation schemes to include some types of deferred
compensation, since the risks of certain investments or trades may not manifest themselves in the
near term. Thus, it makes sense to try to match the tenor of compensation with the tenor of the risk
profile and thus explicitly to take into account the longer-run performance of the portfolio or
division in which the employee operates. This type of compensation arrangement is already in use
at many nonfinancial firms.”). See also FINAL REPORT OF THE INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE COMMITTEE ON MARKET BEST PRACTICES: PRINCIPLES OF CONDUCT AND BEST
PRACTICES RECOMMENDATIONS, at 49–51 (July 2008) (concluding that compensation practices in
the financial sector were a factor in the financial crisis and that they must change to reflect longterm results, but providing vague guidance on how this would come about).
120. One remembers that, not so long ago during the dot.com bubble, entrepreneurs, investment
bankers, and stock analysts asserted that there was a new era of finance without the risks of
traditional business cycles.
121. See, e.g., HERSH SHEFRIN, BEHAVIORAL CORPORATE FINANCE 6–7 (2007).
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managers will themselves be properly trained and motivated to raise longterm concerns.
The standard compensation response, which would be to link
compensation in financial services to long-term performance of transactions
and investments by the individual banker or trader, 122 is unlikely to work. It
is not clear how deferred compensation would be structured in many
situations, such as prime brokerage, and what length of time would qualify
as “long term.” Moreover, it is doubtful that the compensation of many
financial professionals can be tied to the long-term performance of the firm
when firms want the flexibility to end employment relationships without
paying prohibitively for the privilege. In addition, aligning the interests of
agents and the firm does not adequately address the macroeconomic harms
from financial activities, such as systemic risk, since they do not likely even
figure in the financial firm’s calculus in the first place.
Reform that would properly train risk management professionals and
allow them to function properly within financial firms would have to be
fundamental, altering the way firms conduct business and financial
professionals think and conduct themselves, and therefore, it would be a
long-term project. A proper discussion of it is beyond the scope of this
essay. 123 Suffice it to say, finance professionals are familiar with the
standard economic model of the self-interested economic actor, in which
individuals are presumed to act on their own behalf in the pursuit of
wealth. 124 The model is an overwhelming characteristic of the financial
industry because finance professionals shape their views and conduct upon
it (and assume that others do the same), and the result is that alternative
perspectives are otherwise crowded out. 125 These other perspectives are
clearly subordinate even if they would actually help counter the self-interest
focus that leads to the kind of destructive consequences that we see now in
the subprime mortgage crisis. Naturally, changing the basic ideology of
finance professionals will not occur overnight.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE NECESSITY OF ACTIVE REGULATORY
OVERSIGHT
In the short term, therefore, it is necessary for both regulated and
unregulated private financial firms to enhance their risk management. Due
to the shock that these firms have experienced from the current financial
crisis, they are already actively engaged in this task, and there will be little
122. See generally Michael C. Jensen, Foundations of Organizational Strategy, (Harvard Univ.
Press 1998) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=244154 (on
compensation systems).
123. I have undertaken some analysis of this issue in my essay, James Fanto, The Continuing
Need for Broker-Dealer Professionalism in IPOs, 2 ENTREPRENEURIAL L.J. 679 (2008).
124. Id.
125. Id.
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objection to a regulatory mandate on this subject. Yet improvements in risk
management should not be left to the firms, with financial regulators
playing the role of a sideline observer.
This does not mean that regulators need be responsible for designing
risk management models, for this has been outside their expertise for some
time. However, they can be more insistent that regulated firms establish
firm-wide risk management committees and that the committees have real
power in the firm, including with respect to any transactions with the
private financial firms. 126 After all, the regulators have examination and
visitorial powers, 127 which means that they can check on the day-to-day
functioning of the committees and the risk management process. Indeed, the
largest firms are in constant communication with regulators, and risk
management should be an important part of this regular dialogue.
Monitoring the risk management process will be most important when
the current crisis ends and optimism returns to the financial markets, for
that will be the time when firms are most ready to downplay risks.
Moreover, examiners and senior regulators must be more skeptical of the
risk models that the institutions use. One need not be an expert on risks to
question the assumptions of a risk model and to criticize an institution’s
overly optimistic view of the risks facing it.
Financial regulators should be up to the task, despite ongoing
skepticism about the motivation of personnel, who generally come from the
private sector and expect eventually to return to it. As much as financial
regulators will be sympathetic to the industry that they regulate, their
mission is to be concerned about and to promote the long-term health of the
financial industry and thus of the U.S. economy—a focus now absent from
financial firms—not the short-term profitability of a particular financial
institution. With this mission, which the best financial firms must surely
acknowledge, regulators can insist that the firms take into account the risks
facing them. In turn, they can insist that firms select appropriate discount
rates for the pricing of these risks, as opposed to the unduly optimistic ones
that are often used in financial institutions during boom periods. In sum,
regulators have to counter the tendency of financial institutions to focus on
the short term and try themselves not to be swept up into the enthusiasm
over asset pricing bubbles.
The underlying point of this essay’s review of risk management,
occasioned by an examination of the private financial firms and their
relationships with (including absorption by) regulated financial firms, is
simple. It is dangerous for financial regulation and thus for the financial
sector to be overly confident in the benefits of the market model, of which
126. As for the regulators’ relationship with the latter, this indirect regulation, coupled with the
“best practices” approach, remains their only source of influence, in the absence of legislation.
127. 12 U.S.C. § 1844 (2008).
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the private financial firm is a paradigm, and to be equally overly dismissive
of regulation. If anything, risk management involving private financial
firms, whether outside or inside regulated financial firms, has been a case
study in this danger, rather than an example of the obvious supremacy of
the market model. This review suggests that, for the stability of the
financial system, it is time to reestablish the balance between financial
markets and regulation on strong enough grounds so that they endure when
the good times in finance return.

